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I. Introduction
In a discussion of the relationship between art and
technology it has become something of a convention to
remark that the Greek word for art was techne, from which
the term 'technology' is derived. l This etymological
reference is not so frequently made in order to substantiate
an already established relationship, but on the contrary to
point out that the strong tension usually considered to hold
between art and technology is a kind of historical paradox.
For originally, if we take ancient Greece to be the cradle of
Western culture, there was no distinction made between them.
By having them subsumed under the term techne, Greek
writers understood both art and technology as 'the power to
produce a preconceived result by means of consciously
controlled and directed action', to quote R. G. Collingwood's
definition.2 As Collingwood is quick to point out himself,
however, this definition is obsolete for art as we understand it
today. Although we do not have an adequate definition of art,
and probably (perhaps also hopefully) never will, we do not
generally consider art works to be products in the same sense
as, say, manually assembled lawnmowers or mechanically
manufactured rubber gloves. One apparent difference
between art and a technical undertaking is that, in the latter,
the finished product is normally decided upon beforehand -
and often by others than the one who actually does the work
- whereas this is more an exception in the former. Another
would be the tendency - one that already finds its
expression in Kant - to make different and perhaps
51
Literature and Aesthetics
incongruous evaluations of these products in tenns of either
their aesthetic or their functional qualities.
At the outset of the twentieth century, the general attitude
towards technology was extremely positive, even to the point
of being reverential. The early proponents of modernism,
with their explicit agenda of progress over tradition, are of
course the embodiments of such a standing. To be sure, there
were certainly some cases of artists and designers who, while
otherwise being largely modernist in their dispositions,
tended to see technological progress as a threat rather than a
blessing, but these were relatively uncommon. Let's not
forget that modernism was not a coherent unified movement
in any sense of that word; the tenn rather refers to all the
streams of thought responding and reacting to the great
transformation of society that resulted from the political,
scientific and technological revolutions that had taken place
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as the
upheaval of the empirical sciences, the rise of individualism
and of the bourgeoisie, and last but not least, the industrial
revolution. Belonging to the modernist category are
fundamentally opposed movements such as the futurists and
the socialists, both of which welcomed technology, but for
very different reasons. Whereas the futurists glorified the
aesthetic quality of the machine as a symbol of society's
radical transfonnation and evolution, the socialists praised
technology for its accelerative effects on the mode of
production which they believed would facilitate the advent of
a classless society.
The atrocities of the two world wars, however, resulted in a
much more ambivalent attitude towards technology, and it
was then that art began to take on a role as a counterweight to
the dehumanizing forces of technology. A philosophical
representative par excellence of such a view is the later Martin
Heidegger. One of the claims in his seminal essay from 1954,
'The Question Concerning Technology', is that art is
opposed to technology in its mode of relating to the world.
The world, or Being, reveals itself to the technological mind
in a way which he calls 'enframing'(Gestell); that is, as a
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desacralized standing reserve (Bestand), a stock of energy or
commodity.3 Art, on the other hand, can disclose entities for
their own sake, reveal things as things, in their individuality,
their depth, their being. It thus opens up a poetic or aesthetic
sensitivity towards the world which enables us to have a
meaningful relationship with Being, but also with technology
itself by 're-anthropologizing' its determination, since it
brings our manner of relating to the world into balance, by
disclosing it as not merely a bulk of material to be exploited
for our own use, but as a source of value and truth. The kind
of art Heidegger has in mind is meant to transcend the
subjective concentration of modernist aesthetics and
eventually lead to the reunification of (craft) production and
art in lechne.4
Now the technology of Heidegger's concern is the
machine age's technology of nuclear energy, large-scale
industry, the conveyor belt and mass production, which in
essence is also the technology that fascinated the futurists and
the socialists. Whilst such technology is certainly still a strong
feature of our late post-industrial capitalistic era, the notion
of technology rather makes us think of cybernetic systems,
computer networks, biogenetically engineered organisms,
robots, or even androids. This technology is predominantly
electronic, not mechanistic, controlled almost exclusively
through the operation of the computer. Incidentally, the
computer has also become the most innovative medium for
art. Admittedly, computer art, or cyberart, as I will call it here,
may still be in an experimental stage. However, it already
comprises a multiplicity of highly different art forms, such as
media art, multimedia art, interactive art, net art, electronic art,
telepresence art, and much more, which are all created and
circulating in the various spheres of modern society, from e-
commerce, through the universities, to the art galleries and
museums. Its functional capacities and potentials are
continually being expanded, both by means of new
technological innovations, as well as the aptitude of artists to
appropriate and utilize the possibilities of their media. Owing
to its recent development, especially after the World Wide
Web was made public in 1995, its effects on our notion of the
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work of art, our perception of the world and of society as a
whole, have not yet been fully ascertained.
While I shall be exploring some of the latter issues at the
end of this paper, my focus will be on Walter Benjamin's
Marxist analysis of the effects he believed film and
photography would have on our conception of the work of
art, and on the function he wished to assign art in his political
philosophy. Benjamin serves a twofold purpose in this paper.
First, he provides me with a philosophical perspective from
which to compare the different effects of different media on
the work of art. While not always lucid, Benjamin's analysis
is, I believe, insightful and challenging, and remains up-to-
date precisely through the latest electronic innovations in art
media, to which many of his ideas can be extended. Second,
it seems to me that at least some of his observations may be
more applicable to the development of the digital
'revolution' we have been witnessing in the last few decades
than to the emergence of film and analogue recordings with
which he was concerned. This pertains no less to his political
theory of art than to the more technically (or 'purely')
aesthetic inquiry.
Although these two aspects of Benjamin's analysis - the
aesthetic and the political - are not readily separable, I shall
attempt to single them out, respectively, in the next two
sections. The final section, as I have already suggested, will
present a somewhat brief look at the latest fusion of art and
technology in the light of Benjamin's discussion of the new
media of his own time.
II. Aesthetics in the Age of Technical Reproducibility: Walter
Benjamin
About sixty years after the first instrument was invented to
produce photographs mechanically in 1837, the moving
pictures appeared on the screen for the first time. Only a few
years later the possibility of sound recording also put an end
to their silence. Photography, film, radio and music
recordings changed the perception of the world. It seemed
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that events, occurrences and things that before could only be
perceived by a limited number of physically present
individuals could now be lured into some kind of magic
bottle and then let out again in a different time and space to
be presented to an entirely different audience. Technology
had once again achieved magic.
In his essay from 1936, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Its
Technical Reproducibility', Walter Benjamin investigates the
effects of this new technology on art and our understanding
of it. He believes that the innovative art forms of
photography and film will eventually replace older forms
such as painting and theatre, and that they are already in the
process of bringing about a qualitative change in the art
work. This change is characterized by a destruction of what
he calls the art work's 'aura'. This rather mysterious concept
refers both to the work of art as such and to the way in which
we tend to relate to works of art. A confrontation with an
original art work of great quality often inspires feelings of
elevation, reverence or even awe. Benjamin argues that the
apparent sacredness of art works derives from the sacred 'cult
value' of art which it obtained through its original ritual
function. During the long process of the secularization of art
this cult value has gradually been replaced by 'authenticity',
which is constituted by the art work's unique particularity. It
then has taken on a value in itself, detached from any kind of
external function, except perhaps as a commodity. The late
nineteenth century doctrine of art for art's own sake, which
Benjamin calls a 'theology of art', represents the peak of the
demand for art's independence of any kind of social
function. 5
It is precisely this notion of the autonomy of art which is at
stake here. With the advent of the technical reproduction of
art, Benjamin argues, it can no longer maintain its autonomy
as an end in itself. By 'de-auratizing' the work of art, it
becomes a part of the mundane world, just like any other
thing, and thus requires an external criterion of value in terms
of function.
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Benjamin grants that authenticity cannot be reproduced,
neither manually nor technically. It is ontologically
inseparable from the original work of art. While the authentic
original maintains its full authority in the case of a manual
reproduction or a copy, however, it is not the case with
technical reproduction. The reason for this is twofold. First,
the technical reproduction turns out to be more independent
than the original, whether it be the object of an art work or
the art work itself. Photography, for instance, can highlight
only certain aspects of its original object, distort it through
the use of special lenses, or cut up and paste together
disconnected parts of it through photomontage. Secondly, it
can bring a copy into circumstances which for the original
would be inconceivable. Instead of the observer or listener
having to access the original in its location. the copy can now
be brought to him, for example. in the form of a photograph
or an LP: 'The Cathedral leaves its place to find appreciation
by a connoisseur in his studio; the choral work, performed in
a hall or under the open sky, can be heard in a room'.6 In
essence, the original is unchangeable and only partly mobile,
while the copy can be changed in any way one pleases, and
because of its mass reproducibility, be moved anywhere. But
in the first case, one may ask whether Benjamin is speaking
of 'true copies' (to use a kind of oxymoron), and in the
second, whether he is not reducing quality to quantity by
overly valuing the possibility of an indefinite distribution of
art by means of its speedy reproduction. These issues are
actually intimately related.
A 'true copy' would seem to require all, or at least most
of, the attributes of the original. Such a copy of a painting,
for instance, would at least have to appear to be painted with
the same kind of paint on the same kind of canvas. A mere
photograph of a painting would hardly suffice to count as a
'true copy', and even less if the artist had somehow
deliberately distorted it -by rearranging its symmetry
through montage, for instance. Similarly, a recording of a
concert in Benjamin's time must have been greatly inferior in
quality to the concert itself. Although a piece that before
could only be heard at the site where it was being performed
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could now be heard in thousands of private rooms, it would
be questionable to equate the two - for the simple reason
that the copy would be bad. The recording would. of course.
deliver the same composition as was played at the concert. but
the conditions for having the same experience of it would be
largely different - and probably much worse.?
In the case of art works that are originally created through
photography and film. however. Benjamin seems to be right.
It makes little sense to speak of the original photograph or
film. since their reproductions are practically indistinguish-
able from the original. But why is it. then. that we make so
much fuss when comparable situations arise in the case of
painting; that is, when a copy is so close to the original that its
true identity can only be revealed by means of precise
scientific analysis?
Benjamin's argument is that the new art forms will
eventually replace the traditional ones. such as painting and
live concerts. and thus bring about a total collapse of the
reverence with which we tend to approach art works.
Although it is true that the traditional art forms' share of the
art world has been reduced somewhat. this prediction has not
turned out to be entirely correct. 'Authenticity' is still one of
the fundamental categories for appraising art. and not merely
for the sake of assessing its market value.
Most of us would probably be of the (for Benjamin.
decadent) opinion that an excellent reproduction of an art
work. even if visually indistinguishable from the original.
would not be another instance of the same object. because it
would not be the same 'physical object'. For example. upon
learning that the beautiful old town square in Warsaw is a
'mere' post-war replica of what it used to look like before
1944. a person' s perception of it tends to undergo a curious
metamorphosis whereby he or she suddenly considers it in
some way less worthy of admiration or respect - what was
'delightful' before learning its history now becomes.
certainly not 'ugly'. but 'nothing special'. In a rather
Benjaminean fashion. Eddy M. Zemach calls such a position
an 'irrational reverence' and a 'sort of fetishism in art'.
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whereby the material is falsely identified with the art work
itself. Artefacts, he argues, are 'types', not 'unique
particulars' . We value certain paintings because of their
arrangement of colour expanses, and this arrangement
defines a certain thing:
The thing may coincide (for a while) with a certain canvas, but
there is absolutely no reason why it ... cannot also coincide
with other canvases at the same time, or at different times:
reproductions (on other canvases) are the same painting.S
In fact, Zemach takes a stance rather more radical than
Benjamin.9 He locates the original work of art, not in the
physical thing itself, but in its non-physical image. Therefore,
all instances of the same image (presented in its original
form) are the same art work. Now it is not my intention to
evaluate Zemach' s claim for the moment. His argument is
relevant to my discussion in that it brings up an important
ontological question about the art work, a question which has
become even more compelling today, namely concerning its
locative being: where is the work of art? I shall readdress this
question in the final section.
III. Benjamin's Critical Aesthetics
Although Benjamin seems on the surface more descriptive
than prescriptive in his analysis, he has an explicit political
agenda. He sees the new mass media as both symbols and
causal factors of an era in transition in which technological
progress has the potential to serve as the foundation for
political progress - the latter meaning, to him, the liberation
of the masses from the exploitation and alienating powers of
capitalism. This possibility arises from the effects that the new
forms of art have on our perception. The transformed
structure of the art work corresponds to a transformed
manner in which art is perceived and received. In contrast to
the traditional art of painting, which called for individual
contemplation, the art of film aims at shock effects. It seeks
to grasp the attention of the viewer by stimulating her senses
through a disruption of the flow of information. Benjamin
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compares the film with the art works of the Dada movement
in which the display of unorthodox motifs, mundane objects
and obscene remarks shook (and often shocked) the observer
into distraction, thus disallowing her to fall into the
contemplative trance that characterizes the enjoyment of
classical paintings. The contemplative 'immersion, which
became a school for asocial behaviour in the degeneration of
the bourgeoisie, is confronted with distraction as a certain
kind of social behaviour' .10 The film does the same job,
only more effectively, by virtue of the time-space
compression essential to its mode of displaying itself:
Compare the screen on which the movie unfolds with the
canvas on which the painting is located. The latter invites the
observer to contemplation; before it he can let his associations
take their own course. Before the movie recording he cannot.
He has barely had a look at it when it has already changed
again. 11
With the intention of underscoring this point, Benjamin
quotes the words of Georges Duhamel, a passionate enemy of
the movie: 'I cannot any longer think what 1 want to think.
The moving pictures have taken the place of my thoughts.' 12
Duhamel may actually seem to have touched upon one of
the weakest points in Benjamin's argument. After all, the
Nazis used both film and photography as a most effective
means of indoctrination, mute subordination and political
self-monumentalization. Films such as Triumph of the Will
and aerial photographs of the cheering masses helped to
realize the individual's cathartic submission and to drown his
or her possible discontent. Benjamin tries to escape this
quandary by making the following distinction: while Fascism
aestheticizes politics under the banner of art's autonomy, he
wants to politicize art. The former is a utilization of art to
justify and maintain the dominating power by means of
anaesthetizing the masses. Even wars and atrocities are
justified as aesthetic phenomena, as in the Italian futurist
manifesto by Filippo Marinetti on the Ethiopian colonial war:
War is beautiful because it establishes man's dominion over the
subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terrifying
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megaphones, flame throwers. and small tanks. War is beautiful
because it initiates the dreamed-of metalization of the human
body. War is beautiful because it enriches a flowering meadow
with the fiery orchids of machine guns. War is beautiful
because it combines the gunfire, the cannonades. the cease-fife.
the scents, and the stench of putrefaction into a symphony. War
is beautiful because it creates new architecture. like that of the
big tanks, the geometrical formation flights, the smoke spirals
from burning villages, and many others. I3
Under the illusion of 'autonomy', the art work merely
serves the interests of the ruling classes, be it the bourgeoisie
or the Fascist elite, and thus presents itself to the masses as an
esoteric medium controlled by the few. The auratized work
of art further supports concepts celebrated in the Fascist
ideology, such as creativity, genius, eternal values and
mystery. When the creative process is transferred from the
human being to machinery, however, such concepts lose their
application. But this does not come about automatically. It is
here that Benjamin's notion of the politicization of art
becomes relevant. For the artist must show the right tendency.
Art must, in other words, be 'politically correct', and reveal,
not mystify, in order to help people negotiate the norms and
attest the institutions of collective life. Benjamin is not
speaking of propaganda, for he emphasizes that the quality
of the work cannot simply be evaluated on the basis of the
political tendency it displays - it must have artistic quality as
well. This may seem somewhat problematic, for an explicitly
political work of art would tend to be appraised more for its
message than for its style. But 'artistic quality' is for
Benjamin a very special concept, tied up with the artist's
ability to utilize technological innovations for his works. This
should become clearer in a short while.
Now it is customary for Marxist thinkers to analyze the art
work by asking what its position is vis-a-vis the present
production relations of its society. Benjamin, however, wants
to ask what its position is within them. 14 To clarify what he
means by this, he takes the example of the German New
Objectivity movement in photography and literature.
Photography had been a powerful medium for social realists
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who wished to bring attention to crucial social issues.
However, fostered by the invention of superior German
cameras, New Objectivity developed such a refined technique
that it 'succeeded in turning abject poverty itself, by handling
it in a modish technically perfect way, into an object of
enjoyment'. Similarly, their literature 'has turned the
struggle against misery into an object of consumption . . .
The characteristic feature of this literature is the way it
transforms political struggle so that it ceases to be a
compelling motive for decision and becomes an object of
comfortable contemplation' .15 Benjamin calls this tendency
regressive, for whereas it addresses material of revolutionary
significance, the technical treatment of this material simply
involves the refinement of existing techniques of specialized
artistic production. By transforming it in this way into an
object of aesthetic contemplation, bourgeois culture manages
to avoid having to respond to potentially revolutionary
material.
The way to deal with this defence mechanism, Benjamin
argues, is to subvert specialization by breaking the
conventional barriers of the medium. Dadaism is here a
paradigmatic example of this alternative:
The revolutionary strength of Dadaism consisted in testing art
for its authenticity. Still lifes were made out of tickets, spools
of cotton and cigarette stubs in conjunction with pictorial
elements. The whole thing was put in a frame. And then it was
presented to the audience: look, your picture frame blows up
time; the smallest authentic fragment of everyday life says
more than the painting. 16
In this way, Dadaism subverts the claims of painting as a
bourgeois specialism. One could also mention John
Heartfield's photomontage, which, by shaking up the
medium through a combination of image and text, was
capable of making a book-cover into a political weapon. l ?
Now these would be prime examples of what Benjamin calls
artistic quality: he identifies it with technological innovation
that disrupts bourgeois specialization. It is thus demonstrated
by the ability to break down the barriers between the media
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in order continually to override the fixed definition that is
forced upon it in the dominating superstructure of society. A
good work of art always overcomes itself.
Let me now just briefly summarize Benjamin's analysis,
and clarify some of its most important insights. He believes
that owing to the reproductive technologies of film and
photography the work of art is in the process of a radical
transition, which he describes as the loss of its aura. This has
two main, interrelated consequences. First, it loses its
ostensible autonomy, and is thereby revealed as a medium of
communication with necessary political tendencies. Secondly,
especially in the case of film, it both changes and sharpens
our perception with its constant flow of new sensory data.
Technology also enables the artist to transcend the traditional
understanding of art, both by introducing new ways of
artmaking, which brings about a cognitive awareness of novel
forms, and by opening up the possibility of blending
different media in one and the same art work. Thus the
bourgeois claim to specialism in art is subverted, which means
that art becomes an object of mass consumption and critique,
but also that the art work itself becomes an open texture
without boundaries. defying all definitions. 18 Implicit in all
this is also the belief that the established artist-consumer
relationship breaks down when the making of art is no longer
restricted to specialists belonging to the privileged classes.
For Benjamin. then, art is a saving power. as it was for
Heidegger. However. it is not saving us from the perils of
technology: on the contrary, technology becomes art's most
important means to the end of saving us from an unjust
society.
Benjamin's utopian multilateral theory raises a number of
issues. One may note, first, more than sixty years later, that
neither film and photography, nor art influenced by the
technologies of reproduction. has been particularly helpful
for the liberation of the proletariat. As already mentioned,
film was exploited by the Nazis for purposes of propaganda,
and much the same holds for the authoritarian Communist
regimes, by reconstructing auratic impressions. and thus
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mystifying rather than clarifying the complex structure of
political institutions. I believe that a comparable case could
be made for the proliferation of aura in the form of special
effects in contemporary Hollywood blockbuster films. Since
both the production and distribution of the latter are largely
dependent on the commercial interests of private
corporations, there is a preference for works that 'enchant'
the masses into comfortable contemplation, rather than
'distract' them to perceive the problems of the real world. In
fact, there is certainly distraction involved, but it is distraction
from problematic social issues. Script-writers' freedom is
severely limited by the financial interests of the producers.
Similarly, ballistic films, a la Benjamin, that do get produced
are usually low-budget films whose distribution is made
difficult through the unwillingness of most larger cinemas to
take the financial risk of presenting them to their auratically
spoiled patrons. Thus, none of these seems to represent the
triumph of distraction over aura. Further, Pop art, Conceptual
art, and more ironically, the art of Dadaism, have been made
impotent through their incorporation into bourgeois culture,
whereby they have become objects of aesthetic
contemplation, very much like the New Objectivity movement
which Benjamin criticizes. By interpreting these art forms as
presenting new aspects of reality whose aesthetic nature has
not been explored before, and placing them in the
contemplative space of a gallery, the art work's threat to our
most cherished values is dramatically minimized. 19
Consequently, the subversion of the bourgeois claim to
specialism fails.
Benjamin's longed for disintegration of the barrier
between the artist and the consumer has also been realized to
only a small degree. This is partly due to the interplay
between the strong commercialization and the segregation of
art works in spaces explicitly defined as the 'proper' sites for
art, but also to the limitations of the media of photography
and film. For these are one way media, instruments of a
communication that only flows from the artist to the
consumer without offering the possibility of direct feedback.
Interestingly, the playwright Bertolt Brecht, who happened to
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be a close associate of Benjamin, criticized the radio for the
same limitations, and insisted upon the invention of a two way
medium that would take its place:
The radio should be transfom.ed from an apparatus of
distribution to an apparatus of communication. The radio would
be the conceivably greatest apparatus of communication of
public life, an enormous system of channels; that is, it would
be so if it had the capacity of not only transmitting, but also
receiving.20
With the advent of computer technology and the World
Wide Web, Brecht's wish may actually have come true. This
will be taken into further consideration in the final section.
IV. Digital Aesthetics
In the last few decades we have witnessed a massive
eruption of technological innovations whose effects on art, on
our relationship with art, and on society can still be assessed
only hypothetically. The most important of these are
probably the video, the computer, and the Internet. This last
section will be limited mostly to a discussion of the last two.
highlighting only a few aspects that relate to some of the
issues already discussed.
When the video appeared on the public scene in the mid
1960s, it was not only embraced as a promising new medium
for artistic creation, but soon also came to be seen as a
powerful critique of the standardizing grammar of broadcast
commercial television. For some time, it became television's
'other', as it were, re-presenting subjective and concealed
aspects of human behaviour, something which at the time was
inconceivable for a broadcasting medium. It was not long,
however, until video, with all its experimentation and cultural
critique, was incorporated into television, in much the same
way as art galleries incorporated and institutionalized the
avant-garde. Furthermore, and more importantly, the video
has been in a process of digitalization. since it has largely
merged with the computer, and is therefore disappearing
from the arena as a distinct medium. As Michael Nash wrote
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in 1996: 'It was said a decade ago that video art may have
been the only art fonn to have a history before it had a
history, and now its history is history before we had a chance
to mourn its passing' .21 Thus, although the video certainly
plays an important role in contemporary art, with good
reason we can allow ourselves to turn away from the video as
a particular medium and consider it as largely belonging to
the digital realm of cyberspace as well.
Cyberart has many features which distinguish it from most
other art fonns. We may note, first, that digital art work is
immaterial. One may play with the intriguing analogy that
whereas photography and film may have contributed to the
art work's loss of aura, cyberart brings about the loss of its
materiality. Paul Valery's observation from 1934, that there
is a physical part in all arts, is obsolete.22 The objects of the
virtual realm of digital simulation exist only within the
computer in the form of electrical signals translated into
sensory experience. Taking into consideration the perfect
reproducibility of the digital work of art, Zemach is correct in
his claim that the work of art is a type, not a unique
particular, at least if it is created digitally. The specific art
work cannot be located physically; it is a concept or even just
a phenomenon of a certain type. We could be tempted to
identify it with the digital bits out of which it is made, but that
would, first, give it the peculiar ontological status of not
existing or being stored in the same fonnat as it presents itself
to us and, secondly, only give it a qualified physicality, since
a bit is only a number without colour, size or weight. As
William Gibson described cyberspace, borrowing a phrase
from Gertrude Stein, 'there's no there there' .23
Now the development of the Internet as a public medium
may have altering effects on our vision of traditional
paintings and sculptures as well. Museums all over the world
are already exploring the Net as a medium and an alternative
site for displaying their art works. 24 There are even museums
that have never been constructed in physical fonn, but are
only virtual.25 Given the further development of this
tendency, the question may be asked whether we will
65
Literature and Aesthetics
eventually get accustomed to viewing traditional paintings on
the computer screen - whether the screen on our desk will
become the 'normal' setting for Mona Lisa or Guernica -
or will it simply prompt us to go and see the original in its
proper location?26 To be sure, many would say that it is not
the same to see a work of art on a screen. In this respect,
however, we must not forget the continually enhanced
possibilities of computer technology in tenns of both visual
quality and modes of presentation. With the use of wearable
technologies such as data-gloves and -goggles, for example,
we should be able to visit any historical cathedral or other
architectural edifice in virtual reality without having to leave
our room.27 Yet. we may ask once again: is it the same?
Perhaps not, but it may become the most nonnal way of
exploring a work of art, and thus change our perception and
conception of it.
It would seem that the lack of distinction between an
original work of cyberart and its copy would make any kind
of aura in the work impossible. Not being a unique particular,
the art work should not be capable of retaining its sacredness.
However, Benjamin also describes the auratized art work as
'immersing' the spectator: 'he enters the work, as the legend
tells us about a Chinese painter after having observed his
completed picture' .28 This is no longer necessarily a
metaphor, but a virtual possibility. In cyberspace, we can
enter works of art. Virtual reality would seem rather to
immerse us, perhaps not so much in contemplation, but at
least in a temporary departure from the real world. With only
a few exceptions, games and other virtual reality products are
generally not designed to elevate our awareness of social
issues.29 Instead, they are manufactured as relatively
expensive commodities by large corporations which would
probably be more interested in ignoring or concealing them.
We may be looking at the return of the aura in a new form:
the game as a novel opiate for the masses.
The above mentioned fusion of video and computer
technology, however, is of some interest with regard to
Benjamin's thesis, for it signifies a certain realization of his
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demand for the elimination of the barriers between the
media. Benjamin, it would seem, was asking for something we
readily have today, namely multimedia. It is common among
contemporary artists to have the skill and knowledge to
employ different media for the creation of one and the same
art work. Multi-dimensional works of art, such as a singing
book written as a hypertext, or an interactive virtual
simulation of a town inhabited by an 'avatar' for each of the
inhabitants of the actual town,30 are undeniably hard to
define. It is unclear, to say the least, to what category of art
such works should belong, or whether they can be seen as
belonging to any traditional category of art at all. Moreover,
the new media would seem to have a greater potential for
motivating action by means of their shock effects. The
question is, however, whether this potential is actualized to
any significant extent.
Art created through computer technology has attracted
special interest because of its interactive features. We have, of
course, always interacted with works of art in the
interpretative or hermeneutic sense of interaction, and there
are indeed art forms, such as participatory or environmental
theatre, that require the literal participation of the audience.
In the latter case, however, the intended balance has often
been upset by a number of specifically human factors, such
as the relative timidity and passivity of the audience, as well as
the tendency of actors to dominate the interaction)l These
problems can be avoided through the computer. The
interactive cyberart work can respond immediately, for as
long as one wants, and, somewhat surprisingly, people tend to
be more relaxed and playful when interacting with an
inanimate machine, most likely because it does not judge the
participant's performance - at least not yet!
What distinguishes interactive art in cyberspace from older
interactive non-performative art forms is that the former,
when transcending the boundaries of, say, a hypertext with
only limited possibilities of choice, encompasses the
framework for a multitude of individual experiences that are
non-calculable and non-reproducible by another participant.
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No instance of an art work that is created through the
interaction between the computer and the participant will be
reproduced on a different occasion. When the behaviour of
the work, or the medium in which it is produced, cannot be
predicted by the designer herself, the inevitable question of
authorship arises.32
The Internet expands and facilitates the possibility of
multiple interaction between the programme and an
indefinite number of participants. Participation in the
creation of any of the countless virtual worlds on the Net is
open to anyone who has the technological means of access.
The Net, furthermore, enables artistic interaction in another
sense. Some fans of the musical artist Bjork, for instance,
have designed a website where they exchange their own
remixes of her music. Bjork's own remarks about this
undertaking are perhaps characteristic of the changing
attitudes of artists themselves to their works and modified
reproductions of them, which, not so long ago, doubtless
would have been outcried as insolent distortions:
I simply adore my fans' thirst for experimentation. The fact
that people enjoy exploring the edges of my songs swells my
heart with joy. The idea of it all fills me with such pride, ani
enables me to see that people are interacting with my music. I
truly believe that songs are not truly captured in one
interpretation, there's a give and take. When you listen to one
of my songs you bring your own emotions and experiences to
the landscape. It becomes a different experience for each person
and that's absolutely lovely. Thank you, I'm quite amazed at
the outpour of remixes ... I just wanted to let everyone know
that I really do support this site and that I am very glad that
there is such an interest in my work)3
The Net seems in many ways to be the answer to Brecht's
demand for a two way medium. Being theoretically accessible
to anyone, it can function as a 'free space' in which people
can exchange their ideas and opinions on any issues without
external restraint.34 Its peculiar features of blending together
different forms of communication, such as texts, hypertexts,
graphics, film or animation, and various audio features, may
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even have a profound effect on our general perception of our
environment. Many uphold a sceptical attitude towards these
effects. The computer artist and theorist Margaret Lovejoy
fears that we are experiencing a crisis in our mode of
representation:
The structure of this crisis is very familiar. There is a
recurrence of the loss, displacement, and change in
consciousness, similar to the effects on society and culture of
the machine and of the photographic representation
technologies we have been following. The electronic era,
because of its greater complexity and its power to disrupt, is
causing even more fundamental change and loss than did the
machine era. We are again at the end of a century in which
technological developments have transformed culture and living
standards.35
A contemporary optimistic Benjamin would surely see the
intensified time-space compression in today's media rather as
potential for elevating our perceptual habits to a stage in
which our highly complex and fragmented postmodern
reality of information flow, pluralism, vague identities and
multinational capitalism could be better comprehended. The
vast possibilities of cyberart, and the nature of those
possibilities, seem in any case to suggest that Benjamin's
analysis would be more timely today than sixty-five years
ago. An appraisal of the current process of transformation,
however, is rather more problematic, and I shall leave open
the question of whether Lovejoy's sceptical or our
hypothetical Benjamin's optimistic claim is the more
appropriate prediction. What will be can scarcely be
anticipated - but we can at least be fairly sure that because
of cybernetic technology, things will literally never seem the
same again.
In this last section, I have touched upon a mere fraction of
the aesthetically relevant issues concerning digital art. Owing
to its recent birth and ongoing evolution, I have chosen to
restrict myself to questions and hypotheses instead of
attempting to provide decisive answers. It is nevertheless my
hope that I have at least shed some light on this new art
form's possible effects on many of our traditional ideas of
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art, our relationship with it, and its social role. Whilst specific
particulars of these effects can hardly be discerned with any
clarity at the present stage in the development of digital art, it
is, in any case, a development that philosophical aesthetics
cannot afford to ignore.
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